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Piotr Łaciak
Dogmatism and Criticism in the Conception 
of Phenomenological Reduction
Abstract: The author presents his own interpretation of phenomenological reduction tak-
ing as a starting point two motives of phenomenology identified by Ernst Tugendhat: 
the dogmatic motive and the critical motive. In the dogmatic interpretation, phenom-
enological reduction is driven by the need to meet the criterion of apodictic certainty 
and means excluding the world from the scope of phenomenological research and limiting 
it to the realm of transcendental awareness. It is only transcendental awareness that can 
be apodictically certain; the existence of the world never is. In the critical interpretation, 
the starting point for philosophizing is not apodictic certainty but a minimum amount 
of cognitive dogmatism attained through radical criticism. Phenomenological reduction 
itself no longer entails a subjectivist narrowing down of the field of study, but its expan-
sion into a new domain: the domain of awareness in which the world is being consti-
tuted, awareness freed from anonymity. The aim of this critically interpreted reduction 
is the uncovering of the correlation between awareness and the world, which remains 
invisible in the natural approach. Reduction brings this correlation to light, suspending 
prejudices (Vorurteile), which result from the natural approach. The fact that prejudices 
are suspended means that one refrains from following them blindly, since a characteristic 
feature of all prejudices is that they do not admit reflection. It is important to distinguish 
between two types of prejudices: those which enable cognition and those which distort 
the picture of reality. The author demonstrates that phenomenological reduction may be 
understood as a postulate of criticism: to suspend prejudices in order to recognize their 
validity (legitimacy) in their claims to truth or to expose them as false awareness.
Keywords: dogmatism, criticism, phenomenological reduction, certainty, transcenden-
tal reflection, prejudice 
Phenomenological Reduction and its Motivation
The basic thesis of Husserlian phenomenology may be formulated thusly: 
each man “carries in himself” the transcendental Self, but in a natural 





and at the same time, the transcendental of the consciousness can be 
revealed, the consequence of which is phenomenological reduction. “Obvi-
ously it can be said that, as an Ego in a natural attitude, I am likewise 
and at all times a transcendental Ego, but that I know about this only 
by conducting phenomenological reduction.”1 
The natural attitude is the attitude that we take as people thrown 
into the world. In the natural attitude, we are unilaterally directed 
towards the world, and we cherish a belief about the reality of the world, 
without discerning the consciousness as the basis of the validity of this 
belief: an incarceration in the world is characteristic for the natural 
attitude, consciousness brought to the world, forgets about itself, and hides 
from itself.2 
In Husserlian terminology, subjectivity remains anonymous 
in the natural attitude of the transcendental nature, that is, it is not 
subject to reflection. In phenomenology, “anonymous” means “covered,” 
“non-thematic,” “forgotten,” “unfamiliar,” “blind,” as opposed to “being 
liable to reflection,” which means “exposed,” “thematic,” “reaching clear 
consciousness, the evidence.”3 According to Husserl, reflection is the only 
source of knowledge about subjectivity, thus, consciousness which is not 
subject to reflection (anonymous) does not know about itself and remains 
hidden to itself.
The transcendental nature of subjectivity that remains 
anonymous in the natural attitude, can be specified in terms of Karol 
Wojtyła’s terminology as “the irreducible in man,” irreducible 
to the world.4 Subjectivity cannot be reduced to the world and it gains 
the transcendental sense by constituting everything that is global, 
and in addition, it cannot discern this sense in the natural attitude. 
1 E. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations. Trans. D. Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), p. 37. 
2 See E. Fink, “Philosophie als Überwindung der ‘Naivität,’” in: Nähe und Distanz. 
Phänomenologische Vorträge und Aufsätze. Hrsg. von F.-A. Schwarz. (Freiburg–München: Verlag 
Karl Alber, 2004), pp. 107–108; E. Fink, “Edmund Husserl,” in: Nähe und Distanz…, p. 89. 
3 See G. Hoffmann, Bewusstsein, Reflexion und Ich bei Husserl. (Freiburg–München: 
Verlag Karl Alber, 2001), p. 118–132. More about “anonymous”: See P. Łaciak, Anonimowość 
jako granica poznania w fenomenologii Edmunda Husserla. (Katowice: Wydawnictwo 
Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2012). 
4 See K. Wojtyła, “Subjectivity and the Irreducible in Man,” Analecta Husserliana 1978, Vol. 7, 
pp. 107–114. 
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The “irreducible” in man (in Husserlian language: the transcendental 
as the quintessence of subjectivity) can only be revealed by means 
of phenomenological reduction. The concept of phenomenological reduction 
is a rather unfortunate phrase, because it provides an opportunity 
for the misinterpretation of transcendental phenomenology. Ernst 
Tugendhat, who admits that speaking about reduction is misleading, 
highlights this fact. It can be said that the natural attitude is the one 
that can be reduced, because in the natural attitude we are directed 
unilaterally to the world, not perceiving the consciousness in which 
the world is constituted, while, when it comes to the phenomenological 
attitude, we cross the limits of natural cognition and gain an insight 
into the consciousness constituting the world.5 Therefore, reduction does 
not mean a literal reduction, but it is rather a disclosure of the “irreducible” 
in man, the uncovering of the transcendental Self, which is “carried” inside 
by each human being. It is not a coincidence that Husserl says explicitly 
that transcendental consciousness is the residuum of phenomenological 
reduction, in other words, it is what remains after the phenomenological 
exclusion. The reduction reveals the transcendental source of meaning, 
suspending (epoché) what the source veils: in the natural attitude, 
the transcendental nature of subjectivity remains anonymous, because 
subjectivity undergoes prejudices (Vorurteile), which can be described 
as unexpressed, unconscious, unreflexively-fulfilled opinions, founded 
secretly in a natural experience, so that the exposure of the transcendental 
of the consciousness is suspending prejudices at the same time, the source 
of which is naivety of the natural attitude. In this context, one can refer 
to Gerda Brand’s comment that the reduction has two aspects: negative 
and positive, and so it is the cessation “from,” the suspension, and also 
descending “to,” it is the unveiling giving access to the transcendental 
basis.6 
5 See E. Tugendhat, Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 
& Co, 1967), pp. 200, 213. 
6 See G. Brand, Welt, Ich und Zeit. Nach unveröffentlichten Manuskripten Edmund Husserls. 
(Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), p. 6. 
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The reduction should, therefore, bring the subject out of natural con-
cealment, prevent it from oblivion, and refute its anonymity. “Reduc-
tion—according to Paul Janssen—has the character of the theoretical 
discovery of the transcendental basis of natural life and its world.”7 Phe-
nomenological reduction allows for the transition from the natural atti-
tude to the phenomenological (unnatural) attitude; furthermore, the abo-
lition of the anonymity of transcendental life is the consequence of this 
transition. Husserlian phenomenology requires an orientation contrary 
to nature, such an orientation is attained through reflection: instead 
of directing straight towards the objects, we turn to collective experiences, 
in which we become aware of the objects. Stanisław Judycki emphasizes 
the relationship between phenomenological reduction and reflection, argu-
ing that the reduction can be interpreted as “a transition from the natu-
ral attitude—taking place directly, with or without reflection, but then 
as so-called psychological reflection—to the transcendental attitude 
as the reflective-transcendental attitude.”8 The commentator adds: “Adopt-
ing such an attitude, in which consciousness given in acts of reflection 
does not appear as a component of real being entangled in causal-worldly 
relationships, but as the pure transcendental consciousness, is equiva-
lent to the accomplishment of the transcendental reduction.”9 Phenom-
enological reduction can be, therefore, considered as a moment of reflec-
tion: in a reflection, the transcendental is disclosed.10 In other words, 
phenomenological reduction can be understood as a part of the reflec-
tive model of self-consciousness, and can be considered as the moment 
of reflection of transcendental consciousness of itself alone. The anonym-
ity of transcendental subjectivity is overcome after the accomplishment 
of the phenomenological reduction, in such a way that the transcenden-
7 P. Janssen, Geschichte und Lebenswelt. Ein Beitrag zur Diskussion von Husserls Spätwerk. 
(Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), pp. 131–132. 
8 S. Judycki, Intersubiektywność i czas. Przyczynek do dyskusji nad późną fazą poglądów 
Edmunda Husserla. (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL, 1990), p. 181. 
9 S. Judycki, Intersubiektywność i czas…, p. 181.
10 See P. Łaciak, Anonimowość jako granica poznania w fenomenologii Edmunda Husserla…, 
p. 131–142. 
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tal consciousness undergoes a transformation into self-consciousness. 
This self-consciousness is characterized by self-knowledge.11 
The phenomenological reduction itself can be motivated either dogmat-
ically or critically. Ernst Tugendhat discerns of the presence of dogmatic 
and critical motifs in the phenomenology.12 Both dogmatic and critical 
motifs are in fact two different motifs of the phenomenological reduc-
tion, understood as the abandonment of the natural attitude followed 
by the transition to the transcendental subjectivity. As such, these motifs 
are inextricably linked with two ways of achieving the phenomenologi-
cal reduction—Cartesian and Kantian ones, which were used by Husserl 
in his endeavour to consolidate the possibility of performing the reduc-
tion.13 The dogmatic motif is connected with the Cartesian desire 
to achieve absolutely certain knowledge.
From the dogmatic point of view, the aim of the phenomenology 
is to uncover an indisputable sphere of the existence, which is the realm 
of pure consciousness, the consciousness given to us in an absolute cer-
tainty. The phenomenology, as a science of pure consciousness, actu-
ally embodies the idea of rigorous science, that is, absolutely certain 
and definitively established science. In contrast, the final consoli-
dation of cognition cannot be achieved by means of the critical way, 
but understood as the Kantian regulative idea, limiting our cognition, 
while phenomenology is understood as the critique of knowledge, which 
has to prove the legitimacy of our beliefs arising from the natural atti-
tude or expose them as groundless claims. In the context of Tugend-
hat’s distinction of two motifs, Józef Czarkowski points out that Hus-
11 The cognitive relation is shaped during the reflection, namely, subject-object. To be more 
specific, during the reflection, the sphere of consciousness divides into an act of reflection and also 
into the object of reflection. In this way, due to the reflection, the consciousness transforms into self-
consciousness, while the reflective self-consciousness is tantamount to self-knowledge. Self-awareness 
can also be unreflective self-awareness, which means non-objective (unthematic) consciousness 
of oneself. According to Husserl, in case of unreflective self-consciousness, there is no cognitive grasp, 
thus, unreflective (anonymous) self-consciousness is not a cognition. See P. Łaciak, Anonimowość jako 
granica poznania w fenomenologii Edmunda Husserla…, pp. 273–290. 
12 See E. Tugendhat, Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger…, pp. 194–196, 201–205. 
13 About the ways of achieving the reduction see: I. Kern, Husserl und Kant. Eine Untersuchung 
über Husserls Verhältnis zu Kant und zum Neukantianismus. (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff 1964), 
pp. 192–245; P. Łaciak, Anonimowość  jako  granica  poznania w  fenomenologii Edmunda 
Husserla…, pp. 73–121. 
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serl sets forth two tasks: “[…] firstly, the phenomenology has to reach 
to what is given in an indisputable way, adequately and peremptorily, 
and, secondly, phenomenology has to be the final brightening of senses 
and meanings that we attach to objects in science and in everyday life.”14 
Due to those tasks, two ways of consolidating knowledge can be consid-
ered: firstly, about the Cartesian (dogmatic) way, the aim of which is to 
assure apodictic evidence, which has to be the point of departure of radi-
cal philosophy, the evidence, which presents only the transcendental 
subjectivity juxtaposed with the world. This world is never given in com-
parable evidence; secondly, about the Kantian (critical) way motivated 
by the need of the ultimate understanding of the sense of the evidence, 
the understanding which requires the unveiling of covered correlation 
between the consciousness and the world in the natural attitude. 
There is no need to set a distinct demarcation line between “the dog-
matic phenomenology” and “the critical phenomenology.” It can be 
assumed that Husserl’s texts, such as Idea of phenomenology, Five lec-
tures, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomeno-
logical Philosophy or Cartesian Meditations are connected with the dog-
matic motif, whereas, other texts, such as Formal and Transcendental 
Logic, The Crisis of European Sciences and Experience and Judgement 
are the development of the critical motif. Practically, however, these 
two motifs intertwine in individual Husserl’s treatises. The development 
of thought of this German philosopher was gradually abandoning dog-
matism and making the critical intention more promiment. And more 
importantly, the critical motif of phenomenology is clearly recognisa-
ble in his “Cartesian” texts, and still, it was not set free from dogma-
tism in his works considered as “critical.” It can be said directly that 
in some Husserlian works, one of the motifs includes another within 
itself, in such a way that the latter motif is not neglected, but to some 
extent, can be read from the first one. 
14 J. Czarkowski, Filozofia czystej świadomości. Redukcja, refleksja, czysta świadomość 
w fenomenologii transcendentalnej Edmunda Husserla. (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
Mikołaja Kopernika, 1994), pp. 37–38. 
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Phenomenological reduction  
as an expression of transcendental dogmatism 
There is no doubt that within the dogmatic motif, which—to use 
Husserlian terminology—can be called the Cartesian way to reduc-
tion, the restrictive character of the phenomenological reduction is pre-
sented; the reduction is an exclusion of, parenthesising or suspension 
of the world and by this, constitutes a limitation on the area of research 
into the sphere of pure consciousness.15 Following the Cartesian way, 
it begins with apodictic evidence of ego cogito, which is assumed as pre-
given (vorgegeben) and constitutes Archimedes’ point of philosophy, 
and the phenomenology itself, as a science which starts with such 
an apodictic evidence and justified by it ultimately, and turns out to be 
a science radically legitimized and lacking assumption. In this way, apo-
dictic evidence is given as an epistemological, but historically uncon-
ditioned absolute. Hence the conclusion that—according to Andrzej 
J. Noras—“Husserlian phenomenology […] following the Cartesian 
way, is ahistorical.”16 The Cartesian way leads to a transcendental ego 
in “one leap.”17
Apodictic evidence established dogmatically, which means, the evi-
dence understood as the certainty of the existence of things and the state 
of those things, constitutes radical and impossible to correct, criterion 
of cognititive legitimacy, and also the criterion of the phenomenological 
reduction. This means that the phenomenological reduction is in fact 
an exclusion (epoché) of that what is essentially questionable, which 
does not fulfill the requirement of apodictic evidence, and cannot com-
pete with absolutely given transcendental subjectivity. The reduction 
15 See G.H. Shin, Die Struktur des inneren Zeitbewußtseins. Eine Studie über den Begriff 
der Protention in den veröffentlichten Schriften Edmund Husserls. (Bern: Peter Lang, 1978), 
p. 79–80. 
16 A.J. Noras, Kant  a  neokantyzm  badeński  i  marburski. (Katowice: Wydawnictwo 
Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2005), p. 131. 
17 See E. Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale 
Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie. Hrsg. von W. Biemel, 
in: Husserliana—Edmund Husserl: Gesammelte Werke. Bd. 6. (Den Haag: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1962), p. 158. 
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consists in the suspension, parenthesising the so-called general the-
sis of the natural attitude, and as a result, it is based on the suspen-
sion of the existence of the world, which is equivalent to this thesis.18 
The thesis of the natural attitude has a character of conviction based 
certainty of the existence of the world, the certainty, by which we 
become pre-reflectively conscious of the world as the existing, that is, 
existing prior to any possible reference to consciousness, and we recog-
nize ourselves as people existing in the world. The general thesis per-
vades our entire natural life, all detailed existential theses, in which 
there is a recognition of the existence of some (external to conscious-
ness) entities. The thesis should be suspended, because the recognized 
existence of the world does not meet the requirement of apodictic evi-
dence, and it is demonstrated by the “criticism of the world of experi-
ence,” the criticism motivated by the possibility of world-annihilation 
(Weltvernichtung).19 Precisely, the real world recognized in the thesis 
of the natural attitude does not need to exist and it requires the con-
stant confirmation in the further course of the experience. The thesis 
about the existence of the world turns out to be a generally random one, 
and it is suspended between actuality and expectation: that the world is, 
is considered as a fact in this thesis, and this recognition is made under 
the expectation that the future actual sequence of experiences will 
constantly affirm the current course, as the possibility of the collapse 
of the course cannot be excluded; moreover, it is impossible to exclude 
the possibility of the destruction of the world.20 In this context, Husserl 
18 See E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. 
Buch 1: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie. Neu hrsg. von K. Schuhmann. 
Halbband 1. Text der 1.–3. Aufl., in: Husserliana—Edmund Husserl: Gesammelte Werke. 
Bd. 3/1. (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), pp. 62–64. 
19 See E. Husserl, Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Teil 2: Theorie der phänomenologischen 
Reduktion. Hrsg. von R. Boehm, in: Husserliana—Edmund Husserl: Gesammelte Werke. Bd. 8. 
(Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), pp. 69–80. See also E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen 
Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie…, Buch 1, Halbband 1, pp. 96–99, 103–106.
20 See E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie…, 
Buch 1, Halbband 1, pp. 96–99, 103–106. See also T. Seebohm, Die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit 
der Transzendental-Philosophie. Edmund Husserls transzendental-phänomenologischer Ansatz, 
dargestellt im Anschluss an seine Kant-Kritik. (Bonn: H. Bouvier u. Co. Verlag, 1962), 
pp. 59–60. 
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speaks directly about “apodictic confidence of the possible non-existence 
of the world.”21
If possible non-existence of the world is apodictically certain, 
in order to meet the requirement of apodictic evidence, the thesis 
on the existence of the world has to be suspended, subject to reduction. 
The sphere of what is apodictically certain is not subject to the reduction, 
and the sought phenomenological residuum proves to be pure 
consciousness, which remains in its being intact, even though we 
exclude the whole world. Therefore, Husserl juxtaposes the random 
thesis concerning the world with the thesis concerning the existence 
of the transcendental consciousness, which is a necessary thesis, liable 
to question, and as such, does not require confirmation in the further 
course of the experience.22 Even after the annihilation of the world, 
only I myself, as a real psychophysical individual, would share 
its fate, while my pure consciousness would remain intact in its being. 
By emphasizing the randomness of the general thesis of the natural 
attitude, Husserl is able to expose the questionable domain of being, 
the domain of transcendental consciousness, consciousness presenting 
itself in an absolute confidence.
Within the Cartesian-justified reduction, we come to a narrow con-
cept of subjectivity, obtained due to the radical opposition of the tran-
scendental to what is the world. This may result in the Cartesian dual-
ism (absolute) of the necessary transcendental existence and a random 
human being Self, the dualism hindering the understanding of their 
mutual reference and closing access to the study of transcendental con-
sciousness in its specific content. This understanding of the reduction 
leads, thus, to contrasting the consciousness to the world, opposing 
the favourable metaphysical dogmatization of the sphere of the transcen-
dental consciousness, that is, narrowing it to a field of some field of exis-
tence, separated from other fields. On the other hand, the metaphysical 
21 E. Husserl, Erste Philosophie (1923/24)…, Teil 2, p. 69. 
22 See E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen 
Philosophie…, Buch 1, Halbband 1, p. 98. 
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narrowing of the field of consciousness generates a difficulty concerning 
the possibility of the transition from the field of consciousness to other 
fields of being, especially, the field of the world. Thus, the phenomenol-
ogy faces the Cartesian problem of an epistemological bridge as a part 
of a narrow understanding of the consciousness. Moreover, it seems 
that consciousness contrasted with the world, does not form the world, 
because it implies an irretrievable loss of the world.23 The Cartesian 
juxtaposition of the transcendental and the global can thus lead—to use 
a term created by Wojciech Chudy24—to the trap of reflection, which 
means getting stuck in introverted subjectivity, an unintentional one, 
determined only by experiences. Husserl himself was aware of those 
difficulties, and he gradually liberated his philosophy from Cartesian 
dualism and his fundamentalism. 
In the texts from the 1920’s, and in the later development of his 
views in The Crisis of European Sciences, Husserl discerns the flaws 
of the Cartesian way, yet, although he gradually distances himself 
from it, he never abandons it completely. In his text coming proba-
bly from 1924, Husserl writes explicitly that one should avoid talking 
about the exclusion of the world, about the pure consciousness treated 
as something that remains after the exclusion, since it implies that after 
the reduction one concentrates only on the subjectivity and the world 
ceases to be the phenomenological subject. This, in his opinion, opens 
a path towards a psychologistic misinterpretation of pure conscious-
ness: the consciousness might be misunderstood as a purely mental life, 
abstractly extracted from the existing world, which is not the subjectiv-
ity constituting the world.25 
23 See I. Kern, Husserl und Kant…, pp. 203–204. 
24 See W. Chudy, Rozwój filozofowania a „pułapka refleksji.” Filozofia refleksji i próby 
jej przezwyciężenia. (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1995), pp. 115–124. 
25 See E. Husserl, Erste Philosophie (1923/24)…, Teil 2, pp. 432–433. 
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Phenomenological reduction as a critical recognition  
of superstitions of the natural attitude 
In the context of the critical motif, which we call the Kantian way 
towards the reduction,26 the final establishment of cognition upon a firm 
fundament is not actually achievable; instead, it is construed as a reg-
ulative idea, which by the necessity of its importance determines 
the entirety of actual cognitions.27 It is doubtlessly about the regulative 
idea in the Kantian sense, which in Husserl’s phenomenology—in Paul 
Ricoeur’s view—plays a mediating role between history and conscious-
ness, beacuse it is this idea that becomes reified in a never-ending his-
torical process.28 “It is owing to infinity—writes Ricoeur—that the idea 
implies history, the process with no end.”29 As a consequence, the abso-
lute idea of  philosophy is a purpose that settles in the future.30 In this 
context, Iso Kern notes that Husserl’s distancing from the Cartesian 
way towards the reduction and striding with Kantian’s way, in no case 
it does not mean abandoning the ideal of philosophy as a strict science 
but it is only its modification. The modification consists in that the over-
bearing obviousness is no longer the starting point of philosophy but is 
wanted in the way of radical self-criticism. “The absolute evidence—
comments Kern—is no longer something given but something asked, 
that is an idea, as Husserl admits himself in ‘Formal logic and tran-
scendental logic.’” 31 
If overbearing obviousness does not constitute the starting point 
of philosophy, the reduction is no longer motivated by the need to meet 
the apodictic evidence requirement. In consequence, the reduction 
does not yet have the restrictive character, it does not spell the limiting 
26 Here, we use the term “Kantian way to reduction” to signify the way, which Husserl himself 
called the “way through ontology,” “way through critique of the positive sciences,” or the “way 
through Lebenswelt.” On this way, conducting reduction is initially motivated by Kant’s critique 
of cognition. 
27 See E. Tugendhat, Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger…, p. 195. 
28 See P. Ricoeur, “Husserl et le sens l’histoire,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 1949, 
tome 54, p. 282.
29 P. Ricoeur, “Husserl et le sens l’histoire,” p. 291.
30 See E. Husserl, Erste Philosophie (1923/24)…, Teil 2, p. 196. 
31 I. Kern, Husserl und Kant…, p. 237. 
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of the field of examination to the field of the awareness. Husserl’s funda-
mental intention on the critical way, comes down to denudations of cor-
relation between the awareness and the world noticed by Kant. With 
the reduction we reach the awareness that forms the world and form-
ing means the process, which occurs as a part of intentional correlation 
between the awareness and the world. The process in which the world 
along with all objects existing in it, appears in the awareness as it is.32 
We will express the same thought, if we say that with the reduction we 
are reaching not only the sphere of very experiences, but as much cor-
relation between experiences and objects as hidden in natural attitude. 
Therefore the reduction does not entail a subjective narrowing of the field 
of examinations, but its extension for the new dimension-dimension 
of the awareness freed from the anonymity, in which the world is form-
ing in. Iso Kern peculiarly and strongly emphasizes that phenomeno-
logical reduction in a critical interpretation, does not mean limitation 
of the subject to a special field of existence but it constitutes crossing 
restrictions of the natural-objective cognition. The natural-objective cog-
nition appears as “unilateral,” “abstract,” “external,” “superficial” while 
the reduction “appears as a step toward of that what is “versatile,” “spe-
cific,” “internal,” of that what has “deep dimension” (the last one includes 
“the superficial”).33 The reduction can be thusly interpreted as overcom-
ing the naivety of the natural attitude and requires an “overall change 
of the natural attitude.”34 That is the change that Kant called for with 
his Copernican revolution which constitutes “leaving the way of consoli-
dating the naive-objectivist learning.”35 
From this point of view, the phenomenological attitude presents 
itself—as Gui H. Shin comments—as the critical-reflective attitude 
that: as the critical attitude it does not refer to unjustified assumptions 
(superstitions), as the reflective attitude it signifies a turnaround “from 
32 See P. Łaciak, Anonimowość jako granica poznania w fenomenologii Edmunda Husserla…, 
pp. 60–70, 142–158. 
33 I. Kern, Husserl und Kant…, p. 233. 
34 E. Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale 
Phänomenologie…, p. 151. 
35 E. Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften…, p. 202. 
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objective experience of the world to subjective conditions of the possibil-
ity of the cognition.”36 Sebastian Luft determines the criticism as “elim-
inating the naivety.”37 Closely saying, a task of the criticism of cogni-
tion is the suspension of superstitions, of which the source is the naivety 
of the natural attitude. Giving some thought to the scope of the phenom-
enological reduction, Husserl says himself about epoché with reference 
to all superstitions, and the whole of superstitions constitutes the tra-
dition38. A superstition—Husserl thinks—is an “unjustified opinion,”39 
we can add, “unjustified” because established as pre-given (vorgegeben), 
self-evident, accepted before all the recognition, accepted naively, mind-
lessly. Władyslaw Stróżewski notices that the most important feature 
of convictions, and this applies a fortiori to superstition, should be their 
lack of reflection.40 Prejudices lack reflection and this makes their rec-
ognition impossible, because reflection is the only source of knowledge 
about the experiences of the consciousness. If, therefore, it is character-
istic for the natural consciousness to surrender to various kinds of super-
stitions without any reflection, we cannot recognize those superstitions 
in the natural reflection. To recognize the prejudices of the natural atti-
tude, we have to quit this attitude, and we quit the natural attitude 
when we submit it to reflection, which is possible due to phenomeno-
logical reduction. Reflective exposure of the prejudices and their sus-
pension are not two different successive phases of the phenomenologi-
cal method, because the reflective thematisation of prejudices equals 
their suspension.41 The suspension of superstitions means refraining 
from their mindless compliance, that is, subjecting them to the reflection 
36 G.H. Shin, Die Struktur des inneren Zeitbewusstseins…, p. 73. 
37 See S. Luft, “Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie.” Systematik und Methodologie 
der Phänomenologie in der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Husserl und Fink. (Dordrecht–Boston–
London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), p. 66. 
38 E. Husserl, Zur phänomenologischen Reduktion. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1926–1935). 
Hrsg. von S. Luft, in: Husserliana—Edmund Husserl: Gesammelte Werke. Bd. 34. (Dordrecht–
Boston–London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), p. 441. 
39 E. Husserl, Zur phänomenologischen Reduktion…, p. 441.
40 W. Stróżewski, “O przeświadczeniach,” in: Logos, wartość, miłość. (Kraków: Wydawnictwo 
Znak, 2013), p. 88. 
41 See E. Ströker, Phänomenologische Studien. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987), 
pp. 42–43. 
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(recognition).  Therefore, the reflection turns out to be a method of criti-
cism, and the phenomenological attitude is—as previously pointed out, 
referring to Shin—the critical-reflective attitude. The base of knowl-
edge which was not examined should not be accepted in the phenomenol-
ogy, while all superstitions should be recognized, and in addition, when 
the superstition is subjected to the reflection is not superstition any-
more.42 According to Sebastian Luft, the aim of phenomenology, which 
aims to the realization of the idea of philosophy as a rigorous science, 
is surrendering superstitions to the critical reflection, that is, watch-
ing them, understanding them as superstition and “gaining possibly 
the greatest level of self-clarity with reference to the elements which 
have not been thematized yet (in Husserlian terminology ‘anonymous’).” 43 
Husserl distances himself from Cartesian fundamentalism, 
not only because it supports the metaphysical dogmatization 
of the transcendental consciousness, but also because the basic 
thesis of phenomenology about the anonymity of the transcendental 
consciousness present in the natural attitude, quoted at the beginning 
of the article, challenges the Cartesian belief about the self-clarity 
of the consciousness. If the consciousness is initially immersed 
in anonymity, it turns out to be, in the point of departure, unknown, 
veiled, unclear. Moreover, when the consciousness undergoes naturalistic 
prejudices, it becomes one that is hypocritical and false. Naturalistic 
interpretation of the world, typical of the positive sciences which lack 
absolute justification, because they remain within the natural attitude 
and, not only do they undergo world’s prejudice, but they also absolutize 
world ridiculously, slipping into naturalistic prejudices, that is, raise 
to the rank of an absolute what turns out to be something relative—
something that is constantly established by consciousness. This results 
in a complete oblivion of consciousness that establishes the world.44 
This total oblivion of the transcendental subjectivity is called crisis, 
which marks the omnipotent reign of objectivism. Positive sciences 
42 See S. Luft, “Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie”…, pp. 61, 77–78. 
43 S. Luft, “Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie”…, p, 20.
44 See S. Judycki, Intersubiektywność i czas…, p. 218.
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positively heighten anonymity that comes from the natural setting, 
while the crisis might be interpreted as lasting of the transcendental 
life in anonymity.45 The sciences do not reveal the transcendental life, 
but they conceal it with naiveties of a higher order, the theoretical 
ones, whereas, the objectivist interpretation of the world leads 
to the empiricist (skeptical) worldview.46 Therefore, one who believes 
that the positive sciences liberate us from prejudices of the natural 
attitude, is wrong.
In this context, Sebastian Luft points out that the higher degree 
naivety that pervades positive sciences is dogmatized naivety, so that one 
should make a distinction between the natural-naive attitude, one that 
is right for the pre-scientific life in the world, and the natural-dogmatic 
attitude, that is, the attitude of the positive sciences.47 According 
to this distinction, Luft speaks about the “good” and “bad” sense 
of the prejudice. The general thesis of the natural attitude constitutes 
a prejudice in a positive sense, the one that does not conceal the image 
of reality, but makes the world available (in other words, the prejudice, 
which does not impede cognition of the world, but allows for it), while 
we learn about the legitimacy of its claim to be universally binding only 
after the reduction.48 This prejudice is typical of the natural attitude 
naivety, the natural one means pre-scientific, and “the natural attitude—
as noted by Luft—remains concealed for itself, knows nothing of itself 
as the natural attitude, because if it had known about itself, it would 
not be the natural attitude anymore,” 49 and this ignorance protects 
it from dogmatization and the absolutization of the naivety. On the other 
hand, the one in the negative sense (the naturalistic prejudice) distorts 
the image of the reality. Such a prejudice constitutes the dogmatization 
of the naivety comprised in the natural attitude, as it is generated 
45 See P. Łaciak, Anonimowość jako granica poznania…, pp. 28–38. 
46 See S. Luft, “Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie”…, p. 76.
47 See S. Luft, “Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie”…, pp. 61–66, 72–78. 
48 In the natural attitude itself, its consciousness of the bindingness of this world does not allow 
itself to be made a subject of [thematizing], and, in effect, we leave the natural attitude when 
we make it the object of phenomenological study. See E. Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen 
Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie…, p. 151.
49 S. Luft, “Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie”…, p. 61. 
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by the sciences lasting dogmatically in this attitude, and as a result 
of this dogmatization, the natural attitude undergoes naturalistic 
distortion. The prejudice in the negative sense means, therefore, a higher 
degree naivety, which implicates the absolutization of something that 
has only relative meaning, the naivety which insidiously takes root 
there, where it has to be overcome, namely, in science.50 
Phenomenological reduction, essentially, is motivated by the abolition 
of the anonymity of the transcendental life, the anonymity that 
is a source of diverse prejudices. Overcoming the anonymity 
of consciousness in the critical version does not mean an immediate 
shift into the subjectivity, but an arduous work of becoming conscious. 
One reflects on prejudices in order to examine the basis of their 
legitimacy, and in of the absence of such a legitimacy, one exposes 
prejudices as groundless, usurping claims, falsely absolutizing 
relative truths, obscuring the real image of the world.51 According 
to the distinction of superstitions in terms of positive and negative, 
criticism itself is therefore both positive and negative. 
If a prejudice is an unjustified judgment (unjustified because, 
it is mindlessly satisfied), thus, the positive sense that criticism has 
the power to justify and, as a consequence, prejudices become justified 
judgments after conducting such a critique. The critique understood 
positively has to demonstrate that our natural approach to the world 
is well-founded, that the naivety of the natural attitude has its own 
powers, which can be recognized by making reduction.52 The Natural-
naive life is permeated with a thesis on the existence of the world, because 
this thesis should be considered as a universal prejudice.53 This universal 
prejudice is founded secretly in all the natural experience and the source 
from which it draws its sense, cannot be identified in the natural attitude. 
50 See S. Luft, “Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie”…, pp. 65–66. 
51 See S. Luft, “Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie”…, p. 66. 
52 See E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie…, 
Buch 1, Halbband 1, pp. 120–121. See S. Luft: “Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie”…, p. 66.
53 See E. Husserl, Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925. 
Hrsg. von W. Biemel, in: Husserliana—Edmund Husserl: Gesammelte Werke. Bd. 9. (Den Haag: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), pp. 528–531.
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The critical recognition of the basis of the legitimacy of the thesis 
of the natural attitude constitutes the transcendental insight that is pos-
sible due to the phenomenological reduction. Invalidating this thesis 
in not the result of this recognition. Husserl, unlike Descartes, never 
doubted the existence of the world. The phenomenologist does not dispute 
the existence of the world of the natural attitude, but he tries to under-
stand it. “That the world exists, that it is given as the existing universe 
in uninterrupted experience that is constantly fusing into universal 
concordance, is entirely beyond doubt. But it is quite another matter 
to understand this indubitability that sustains life and positive science 
and to clarify the ground of its legitimacy.”54 The phenomenologist does 
not invalidate the general thesis of the natural attitude, but recognizes 
it, trying to understand as the belief, from which depends the validity 
of our experience of the world. Recognizing the thesis of the natural atti-
tude, we only change the modus; the modus of the experience lacking 
reflection (prejudice) into the modus of the experience that was subject 
to reflection (thematic). In the natural attitude, the thesis about the exis-
tence of the world as a universal prejudice conceals itself from reflection, 
and only after the epoché is done, it is released from an anonymous com-
pliance and is made more distinct as an experience conditioning the exis-
tence of the world. By making reduction, we realize that we find the exist-
ing reality only because we recognize it as an existing one, we recognize 
it under the thesis of the natural attitude, and that we have to pres-
ent the reality as co-acknowledged in the thesis, as the thesis correlate, 
finally: as the correlate of subjectivity that operates as the one that ful-
fills the thesis. After the reduction, we recognize the thesis of the natu-
ral attitude as the constituting achievement of consciousness, because 
the constitution itself expresses the correlation between consciousness 
and the world, the correlation hidden in a natural attitude, while 
the reduction is uncovering the process of the transcendental consti-
54 E. Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. 
Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution, trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer. 
(Dordrecht–Boston–London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), p. 420.
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tution of the world.55 Consequently, the thesis of the natural attitude 
has its privilege in hidden setting intentional functions of consciousness 
in the natural attitude. In this way, by suspending the thesis of the nat-
ural attitude as a universal prejudice, the phenomenologist reaches 
the absolutely given transcendental subjectivity by using reflection, 
which should be considered as a source of the legitimacy of the thesis. 
In contrast, the criticism in a negative sense is pervaded 
with unmasking intention: it is tracking those superstitions, which 
will always remain unjustified judgments, namely, judgments, whose 
claim to gain power turns out to be groundless. Negative criticism 
which is understood, means releasing the cognitive consciousness 
from prejudices in the “wrong” sense, particularly, from the naturalistic 
prejudices. If the naturalistic prejudices are dogmatization of the naivety 
comprised in the thesis of the natural attitude, hence, the recognition 
of the base of the legitimacy of the thesis of the natural attitude 
is, at the same time, unmasking false consciousness (consciousness 
obscured with naturalistic prejudices). As a result, the critical recognition 
of the natural attitude thesis has healing power for the positive sciences. 
By recognizing the thesis of the natural attitude as an experience that 
constitutes our natural world, the phenomenologist releases the world 
and the sciences from ridicule, naturalistic absolutization, and this 
results in depriving them of their typical naivety. Phenomenology, 
therefore, does not eliminate the world cognition, but explains its sense, 
limiting to what is constituted, that is to say, to the world as a correlate 
of constitutional achievements of consciousness. Natural cognitions 
are abolished to the extent, in which they are deprived of naturalistic 
naivety, while they are retained to the extent in which they undergo 
the transcendental understanding.56 Reduction as a change in attitude 
is exceeding the limits of the natural-objective knowledge, but this 
55 See P. Łaciak, Anonimowość jako granica poznania…, pp. 142–158. 
56 See E. Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation. Teil 1: Die Idee einer transzendentalen 
Methodenlehre. Texte aus dem Nachlass Eugen Finks (1932) mit Anmerkungen und Beilagen 
aus dem Nachlass Edmund Husserls (1933/34). Hrsg. von H. Ebeling, J. Holl, G. van Kerckhoven, 
in: Husserliana—Dokumente. Bd. 2/1. (Dordrecht–Boston–London: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1988), pp. 129–130. 
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excess does not mean its impoverishment, but enrichment with the new 
deep dimension, with the dimension of transcendental subjectivity, 
in which this knowledge is included and from which derives sense.57
In the critical version, the phenomenological reduction can be 
considered as a postulate of criticism: one should suspend the validity 
of any prejudices in order to recognize the legitimacy of its claims 
to the binding force or to expose as false consciousness distorting 
the image of reality. The idea of suspending prejudices turns out to be 
an endless work, as the complete self-clarity of the consciousness 
actually can never be achieved, but it has a regulative sense, the sense 
of an unfinished task.58 Thus, phenomenology is set to fulfill the idea 
of philosophy as a strict science, or the universal and absolutely justified 
science, but the complete and full self-knowledge of the transcendental 
consciousness is not possible. Rigor should—according to Seebohm—
refer to ultimately justifying criticism, if the opportunity of conducting 
such a criticism is apodictically certain.59 One should remark that 
in phenomenology, the criticism is possible only on the basis of the apodictic 
attitude of certainty. According to Tugendhat, the combination of critical 
motivation and dogmatic motivation constitutes a dogmatic assumption 
that weakens the radicalism of criticism.60 However, such a viewpoint 
is disputable. Husserl’s intentions are described better by Klaus Rosen, 
who in contrast to the Tugendhat, concludes that criticism can only be 
radical when it is done on the basis of apodictic evidence. “Pure imma-
mence of evidence—as Rosen writes—is required as the medium of phe-
nomenological research, because the critique of knowledge wants to be 
radical. The dogmatic theme does not join the critical theme acciden-
57 We can say outright that it is precisely in the natural attitude that scientific cognition 
becomes impoverished, because the sciences, immersed in the world, investigate established fields 
without perceiving the consciousness in which these objects are constituted.
58 See G. Hoffmann, “Die Zweideutigkeit der Reflexion als Wahrnehmung von Anonymität,” 
Husserl Studies 1997, Vol. 14, p. 116. 
59 See T. Seebohm, Die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Transzendental-Philosophie…, p. 65 
(footnote 45). 
60 See E. Tugendhat, Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger…, pp. 195–196. 
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tally or on a whim, but it is the radicalism of the criticism that requires 
the dogmatic ground of evidence.”61
The thesis that the dogmatic motif is attached to the critical 
one, is however, quite inaccurate. The very apodictic evidence 
in the dogmatic interpretation turns to be a prejudice from the point 
of view of the criticism of knowledge, because it is founded as a given 
in advance, naively regarded as the beginning of all philosophy, adopted 
before any possible justification. If the phenomenology in the critical 
version should not accept any prejudices, it also cannot naively 
assume the apodictic evidence of ego cogito. Therefore, phenomenology 
requires criticism in relation to itself: the requirement of criticism 
must be transferred to the criticism of the phenomenological evidence 
of the description of the transcendental sphere.62 Otherwise, we will 
not move beyond the level of transcendental naivety.
Providing that the apodictic nature of ego cogitois beforehand 
made a requirement for the testing of the legitimacy of any claims 
in the dogmatic interpretation, the requirement naively accepted without 
critical examination of its rationale, then in the critical interpretation, 
we try to undermine the legitimacy of the apodictic evidence, 
subjecting it to a negation and doubt test in reflection. It turns out that 
the apodictic evidence of ego cogito cannot be negated, because with each 
test of negation or doubt it is confirmed again: if I try to acknowledge 
ego cogito each single time (for example, the content of the observation) 
as non-existent or doubtful, then immediately, I understand 
the groundlessness of the assumption of non-existence and being 
undeniable in the critical reflection, in such a way that the very existence 
remains not only intact, but also confirmed.63 Hence, the conclusion 
that for the apodictic nature “I am”—as noted by Shigeru Taguchi—
61 K. Rosen, Evidenz in Husserls deskriptiver Transzendentalphilosophie. (Meisenheim 
am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1977), p. 147. 
62 See E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen 
Philosophie…, Buch 1, Halbband 1, p. 133. More on the self-criticism of phenomenology: see S. Luft, 
“Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie”…, pp. 8–22.
63 See E. Husserl, Einleitung in die Philosophie. Vorlesungen 1922/23. Hrsg. von B. Goossens, 
in, Husserliana—Edmund Husserl: Gesammelte Werke. Bd. 35. (Dordrecht–Boston–London: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), pp. 63, 116. 
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there is not only no real, but also an ideal or imaginative alternative 
that would contradict it, because all possibilities are rooted in this 
apodictic nature.64 In the light of the phenomenological self-criticism, 
the apodictic evidence appears to be the  minimum of dogmatism of all 
knowledge, because all knowledge is done within the apodictic nature 
of ego cogito. The criticism of knowledge reaches the evidence which does 
not require any further criticism of the obvious: each attempt to justify 
it would be pointless, since all justification must be based on it.65 One 
names the apodictic evidence of ego cogito the minimum of knowledge, 
because it is the basis of all of binding, the foundation, without which 
one cannot think of any knowledge, but that which does not enrich 
the content of knowledge.66 As the minimum of the dogmatism of knowl-
edge, the apodictic evidence is no longer—as in the Cartesian way—
the restrictive requirement of the certainty of the knowledge which lim-
its the field of phenomenological research to the sphere of absolutely 
given consciousness and favouring the metaphysical dogmatization 
of this sphere. Therefore, if one discusses the combination of the criti-
cal motif with the dogmatic one, it is not in the sense that the dogmatic 
motif attaches to the critical motif absolutely, but in the sense that 
the criticism of knowledge requires a minimum of dogmatism, which 
constitutes the apodictic evidence, without which no knowledge would 
be possible.
64 See S. Taguchi, Das  Problem  des  „Ur-Ich”  bei  Edmund  Husserl.  Die  Frage 
nach der selbstverständlichen „Nähe” des Selbst. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), p. 210. 
65 See S. Taguchi, Das Problem des „Ur-Ich”…, p. 212 (footnote 76). 
66 See S. Taguchi, Das Problem des „Ur-Ich”…, p. 121. 
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Dogmatyzm i krytycyzm 
w koncepcji redukcji fenomenologicznej
Streszczenie: Autor przeprowadza własną interpretację redukcji fenomenologicznej, 
wychodząc od wyróżnionych przez Ernsta Tugendhata dwóch motywów fenomenologii: 
motywu dogmatycznego i krytycznego. W interpretacji dogmatycznej redukcja fenome-
nologiczna jest motywowana potrzebą spełnienia wymogu oczywistości apodyktycznej 
i oznacza wyłączenie świata oraz ograniczenie pola badań fenomenologii do dziedziny 
świadomości transcendentalnej. Jedynie świadomość transcendentalna bowiem może 
być dana w oczywistości apodyktycznej, podczas gdy istnienie świata nie jest nigdy 
apodyktycznie pewne. W interpretacji krytycznej oczywistość apodyktyczna nie jest 
punktem wyjścia filozofowania, lecz minimum dogmatyczności wszelkiego pozna-
nia odnalezionym na drodze radykalnej krytyki. Sama redukcja fenomenologiczna 
nie oznacza już subiektywistycznego zawężenia pola badań, lecz jego rozszerzenie 
o nowy wymiar: wymiar wyzwolonej z anonimowości świadomości, w której konsty-
tuuje się świat. Celem redukcji zinterpretowanej krytycznie jest odsłonięcie zakrytej 
w nastawieniu naturalnym korelacji świadomości i świata. Redukcja odsłania tę kore-
lację, zawieszając przesądy (Vorurteile), które wypływają z nastawienia naturalnego. 
Zawieszenie przesądów oznacza powstrzymanie się od ich bezrefleksyjnego spełnia-
nia, to znaczy poddanie ich refleksji, ponieważ cechą charakterystyczną przesądów 
jest bezrefleksyjność. Należy odróżnić dwa rodzaje przesądów: przesądy, które umoż-
liwiają poznanie świata oraz przesądy, które zniekształcają obraz rzeczywistości. 
Autor wykazuje, że redukcję fenomenologiczną można potraktować jako postulat kry-
tycyzmu: należy zawieszać przesądy po to, aby rozpoznać zasadność (prawomocność) 
ich roszczeń do mocy obowiązującej bądź zdemaskować jako fałszywą świadomość.
Słowa kluczowe: dogmatyzm, krytycyzm, redukcja fenomenologiczna, oczywistość, 
refleksja transcendentalna, przesąd
